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Ryan’s Express v. Amador Stage Lines, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 27 (Jun. 14, 2011)1
APPELLATE PROCEDURE – LAW FIRM DISQUALIFICATION
Summary
The Court considered a motion to disqualify a law firm from participating in the appeal
of a failed settlement program.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court concluded that screening may be used to cure imputed disqualification.
Additionally, the Court adopted a nonexhaustive list of factors used to determine whether the
implemented screening measures are adequate.
Factual and Procedural History
Ryan’s Express appealed from a district court’s dismissal of its claims against Amador
Stage Lines. The appeal was sent to the Court’s settlement program where Nicholas Fey, a
shareholder at the law firm of Woodburn and Wedge, was the appointed settlement judge. Fey
held a settlement conference and received confidential information, but the parties did not reach
an agreement.
Following the settlement conference, Amador’s counsel joined Woodburn and Wedge as
a shareholder and the firm substituted as counsel for the current appeal. Because of Frey’s prior
involvement as settlement judge, Ryan’s Express moved to disqualify Woodburn and Wedge
from the case. Amador conceded Frey’s disqualification, but argued that the firm took taken
adequate measures to cure the conflict of interest.
Discussion
Justice Douglas wrote for the unanimous Court, seated en banc. Ryan’s Express argued
that Frey’s disqualification must be imputed to all of the attorneys of Woodburn and Wedge.
Ryan’s Express also argued that curing the conflict of interest via screening is not possible in this
case because Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct 1.10(e)(1) allows screening only when the
disqualified lawyer did not have “a substantial role in or primary responsibility for the matter
that causes the disqualification.” Furthermore, Ryan’s Express argued that, as a matter of public
policy, protecting the reputation of the settlement program outweighs Amador’s right to choose
any counsel.
Amador countered by arguing that Fey is of the highest integrity and would never
compromise the program. Amador also claimed that disqualification of the firm would “impose
substantial hardship” in their pending appeal. Finally, Amador contends that RPC 1.12 –
permitting the screening of mediators, arbitrators, and former judges to prevent imputed
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disqualification – applies to the case and Woodburn and Wedge utilized significant screening
procedures.
The Court reaffirmed the authority of the Court to govern the lawyers appearing before
it.2 It stated that settlement judges have duties of confidentiality and avoidance of conflicts of
interest, duties that remain in effect after the settlement proceedings conclude. In addition,
settlement judges must avoid the appearance of impropriety. The Court held that Frey is
disqualified and that Woodburn and Wedge are also disqualified unless the firm can prove that
Frey was “timely and adequately screened” per RPC 1.12(c).
In considering the screening process, the Court weighed the competing interests of one
client’s right to choice of counsel against another client’s desire to prevent the leak of
confidential information. Because the settlement program is court-sponsored, any improper
behavior will reflect poorly on the judicial process. At the same time, disqualification of law
firms without exception could deter attorneys from serving as settlement judges and would
restrict a client’s choice of counsel. Ultimately, the Court held that screening may be used to cure
imputed disqualification.
The Court went on to discuss the factors to be considered when determining whether a
firm has adequately screened its lawyers. The burden of proof is on the party seeking to cure
disqualification with screening. The party must show that the screening is appropriate and that
the disqualified attorney is timely and appropriately screened. The Court, considering factors
used by other courts, put forth five factors, not exhaustive: (1) instructions given to ban
communication between the disqualified attorney and the firm; (2) restrictions on access to files;
(3) the size and structure of the firm; (4) the likelihood of interaction between the disqualified
lawyer and others in the firm; and (5) the timing of the screening measures.
Despite the submission of affidavits by Amador, the Court concluded that additional fact
finding is required to determine whether the screening measures of Woodburn and Wedge rebut
imputed disqualification. The Court asserted that the district courts are superior at answering
questions of fact due to their experience.
Conclusion
The Court remanded the motion to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the
sufficiency of the screening measures used by Woodburn and Wedge. Accordingly, the Court
deferred ruling on the motion to disqualify until the district court’s findings are concluded.
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